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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
Ass1GNM£NTs-TRANsn:R oF ExPf:CTANCY.-A, the apparent heir of his
mother, executed a warranty deed conveying to defendants his expectancy in
the realty of his mother. He died during her life, and after her death his
children bring suit to have the deed cancelled as a cloud on their title Held,
that the relief prayed should be granted on the ground that the complainants
were not bound by the warranty of the father, as they did not take as his
heirs, but as the heirs of their grandmother, only tracing relationship through
the father. Johnson v. Breeding (Tenn. 1916), 190 S. W. 545. A transfer
by the heir of his expectancy is void at law, being the transfer of a mere
contingency or possibility; see cases collected in 4 CYc. 15. In Jackson v.
Bradford, 4 Wend. 619, the conveyance made by the heir in the lifetime of
the ancestor was de<':lared void at the suit of one who claimed under a
judgment lien entered against the heir prior to the conveyance. In Wheeler.
v. Wheeler, 2 Mete. (Ky.) 474, it was held that as the conveyance was void
the contract fell with it, and was no defence to an action by the grantor
against the executor for the estate devised to him by the will. Where the
conveyance is with warranty the grantor and all claiming through him are
estopped to set up an after-acquired title. Fairbanks v. Williamson, 7 Me. 96.
The assignment of an expectancy is valid in equity and will be enforced as
a contract to convey whenever the expectancy ripens into a vested estate.
Elder v. Frazier (Ia. 1916), 156 N. W. 182. But where, as in the principal
case, the expectancy never becomes a vested estate in the grantor, the assignee
takes nothing. Donough v. Garland, 269 Ill. 565, 109 N. E. 1015, Ann Cas.
1916E, 1238 and note. See also Dungan v. Kline; 81 Oh. St. 371, 90 .N. E. 938.
AuroMoBII.r:S-INJURY TO Um.1ctNSr:D MOTORCYCLlST.-Plaintiff, an unlicensed motorcyclist, was run into by defendant, who was operating an
automobile. Defendant contended that as plaintiff had no license, he was
a mere trespasser on the highway, and entitled to protection only from wanton or malicious injury. Held, want of license, being in no way the proximate cause, does not preclude recovery of damages for injuries due to mere
negligence. Marquis v. Messier, (R. I. 1917), 99 Atl. 527.
This is the accepted view in a majority of the states where this question
has come up. Stovall v. Co., 189 Ala. 576, 66 So. 577; Armstead v. Lounsberry, 129 Minn. 34 151 N. W. 542; Anderson v. Sterit, 95 Kan. 483, 14$
Pac. 635. But the law in Massachusetts has been in a rather peculiar state,
from the passage of the old Sunday law down to the cases of Chase v. Railroad Co., 208 Mass. 137, and Bourne v. Whitman, 209 Mass. 155· It has
often been said that the early Massachusetts cases failed to distinguish between an illegal act as a condition, and an illegal act as a contributing cause.
The cases did, however, draw this distinction in principle (McGrath v. Merwin, II2 Mass. ,¢7; Smith v. Railroad, 120 Mass. 490), but this still left
the situation unsatisfactory, for the courts could not see their way clear
to hold violations of the statutes not a contributing cause. For instance,
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in McGrath v. Merwin, supra, it was held that the fact that the plaintiff
was working on Sunday was a contributing cause to his injury in that work,
and in Smith v. Railroad, supra, where plaintiff was injured on one of defendant's railway crossings, the same was held of the fact that plaintiff was
traveling on Sunday. So, following the lead of other states, KNowr:roN,
C. ]., in Bourne v. Whitman, supra, held that the test should not be: is the
illegal act a contributing cause? but held that the act itself should be
separated and analyzed, and the test be: is the illegal element of the act,
considered by itself alone, a contributing cause? So if only that part of
the act or conduct which is innocent affects the cause of action, the existence
of an illegal element is immaterial. This applies only to that part of the
statute requiring a personal license. This question has never yet been mooted
in the Michigan Supreme Court, but will be if the Detroit justice court case
of Brause v. Adams E~press Co. goes up. As to that part of the statute
requiring a license for the machine, it is usually held that failure to comply;
with the statute renders the machine and all its occupants trespassers on the
highway, and entitled to no protection from injuries resulting from another's
mere negligence. This was laid down very reluctantly in Chase v. Railroad,
supra, but is now the established law in Massachusetts.
BILLS AND NOTtS-EFFr:CT OF NEGOTIABLE !NSTRUMEN'l'S ACT ON USURY
LAws.-The West Virginia Code declares all notes given for usurious interest void as to the excess interest. The NEGOTIABLE !NS'l'RUMEN'l'S Ac:r
provides that a holder in due course takes the instrument free from any
defect in the title of his vendor. Held, the maker of the note may set up
the usury in the inception of the note against a holder in due course.
Eskridge v. Thomas (W. Va. 1916), 91 S. E. 7.
That the desired uniformity of laws concerning negotiable paper which
has led so largely to the adoption of the uniform statute is to fail in part
is shown by the group of decisions-of which the principal case is an illustration-concerning the effect of that statute upon other Jaws of the state
such as the usury laws. Prior to its adoption it was generally held that
where a usury statute declared a note usurious in its inception void, either
as a whole or as to the excess interest, the note was void to the specified
extent even in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value. The court!!
reasoned that no vitality could be given to a void instrument merely by· sale
or exchange. 39 Cvc. 1079 and cases cited. There was however some
authority to the effect that it was the intention of the legislature in enacting
the usury statute to make the instrument voidable as between the parties
to the usury rather than absolutely void as an instrument; thus in effect
substituting "voidable" for "void" in the statute. Ewell v. Daggs, 1o8 U. S.
145, 27 L. Ed. 682; Myers v. Kessler, 142 Fed. 730, 74 C. C. A. 62; Gordo1'
v. Levine, 197 Mass. 263, 83 N. E. 861. The question presented by •the principal case is whether in enacting §57 of the NEGO'trABLE "!NSTRU;MEN'l'S ACT
to the effect that a holder in due course takes the instrument free from any
defects in his vendor's title, and free from defenses available to prior parties
among themselves, it was the intention of the legislature to repeal the voiding
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statute in so far as it affected the instrument in the hands of a holder in
due course. One line of authority has emphasized the desirability of securing
the ample protection to purchasers of negotiable. paper and the ease of circulation which are demanded by the commercial world, and considers that
these factors were of such importance to the minds of the legislators that
the statute should be held to repeal by implication the usury statute as far
as affecting the rights of a holder in due course. And this even in states
where the prior rule was that the instrument was absolutely void. Klar v.
Kostiuk, 65 Misc. 199, n9 N. Y. Supp. 83; Emmanuel v. Misiciki, 149 N. Y.
Supp. 905; Wirt v. Stubblefield, 17 App. D. C. 283. See also Schlesinger v.
Lehmauer, 191 -N. Y. 6g, 83 N. E. 657. The contrary view supported by the
principal case argues that the usury statute is of a police nature and, though
the fostering of commerce is of great importance, the prevention of crime
is of more, and since repeals by implication are not favored it will be deemed
that the legislature did not intend to modify the usury statute. Perry Saving's Bank v. Fitzgerald, 167 Iowa 446, 149 N. W. 497; Sabine v. Paine,
166 App. Div. 9, 151 N. Y. Supp. 735; Cruisins v. Siegman, 81 Misc. 367,
142 N. Y. Supp. 348; Alesander v. Hazelrigg, 123 Ky. 677, 97. S. W. 353. It
would seem that the effect of the usury statute in declaring the instrument
void in its inception is not merely to create a defect in the title to the
instrument but to prevent the coming into existence of any instrument at
all, and hence that this is not a case where there is any basis for the application
of §57· If this view is sound it follows that the decision in the principal
-case is correct.
Bms AND Nor:r;;s-N:r;;coTIAl!ILITY AS Ml1:£CT:£D BY A PRoVISION FOR Ex'l':£NSION 011 TI11i::r;;.-A promissory note contained the following provision:
"We authorize the holder thereof to e."Ctend the payment of same or any
part thereof.~' Held, that the provision did not render the note non-negotiable under the requirement of the negotiable instruments law that an instrument to be negotiable must be payable at a fixed or determinable future
·time. Bank of Whitehouse v. White (Tenn. 1917), 191 S. W. 332.
A provision for a definite extension or renewal after maturity does not
-render a note non-negotiable. American Loan & Trust Co. v. Stickney,
1o8 Ala. i46, 19 So. 63, 31 L. R. A. 234; Bank v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136
N. W. 204, 49 L. R. A. N. S. 132. But see Miller v. Poage, 56 Iowa g6, 8 N.
W. 799. Where the provision is not for a definite time, but at the option of the
holder, the decisions are in conflict. A provision that the holder may extend the time of payment from time to time has been held to render the
note non-negotiable. Woodbury v. Roberts, 59 Iowa 348, 12 N. W. 312;
Rosenthal v. Rambo, 165 Ind. 584, 76 N. E. 404; Bank v. Wheeler, 75 Mich.
346, 42 N. W. g63; Coffin v. Spencer, 39 Fed. 262; Bank v. Hesslet, 84 Kan.
315, 113 .Pac. ·1052. Contra," Bank of Commerce v. Kenney, g8 Tex. 293, 83
S. W. 368; Bank V. Loukonen, 53 Colo. 489, 127 Pac. 947; Trust Co. v. Long,
31 Okla. 1: 120 Pac. 291 ; Bank v. Stover, 21 N. Mex. 453, 155 Pac. 905 ;
Da1--is v. McCo!l, 179 Mo. App. 1g8, 166 S. W. n13. In some states it has
been hcld: that a ~rovision wai.Jing ~'all defences on the ground of extension
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of time of payment" makes a note non-negotiable. Mitchell v. St. Mary,
148 Ind. III, 47 N. E. 224; Bank v. Gunter Bros., 67 Kan. 227, 72 Pac. 842;
Batik v. Bolan, 14 Ida. 87, 83 Pac. 5o8. Contra, Bank v. Buttery, 17 N. D.
326, n6 N. W. 341; Farmer v. Bank, 130 Iowa 469, 107 N. W. 170; DeGroat
v. Focht, 37 Okla. 267, 131 Pac. 172. Some courts have attempted a middle
ground and held that the note is negotiable provided the option for extension of time is effective only after maturity. Bank v. Dolson, 163 Calif. 485,
126 Pac. 153; Stitzel v. Miller, 250 Ill 72, 95 N. E. 53; Contra, Bank v.
Piollet, 126 Pa. 94. 17 Atl. 6o3. The trend of modem decisions under the
Negotiable Instruments Act appears to be in accord with the holding of
the principal case.
BILLS AND NOT~s-PruosuMPTION oF CoNSIDSRA'rION.-An instrument read:
"As a bequest I promise to pay the sum of $500 to be due and payable
after the decease of both myself and wife without interest," and made payable to the church of which the maker was a member. In suit against the
executor of the maker, held to be a valid promisory note, the consideration
being presumed. First Presb3•terian Church v. Dennis (Iowa 1917), 161
N. W. 183.
The above case is interesting from two aspects. The defendant contended that the words "as a bequest" negatived the presumption of consideration which attaches to negotiable paper, and hence that the plaintiff church
must prove that such existed. The court overruled this objection and held
that the word "bequest" as used here must not be construed in its possible
narrow sense as a "gift" for which there was no valid consideration, but
rather as transforming the note into a valid agreement to pay the $500 as
a bequest-i. e., as a designation of the time of payment and the purpose
of the maker. The court, relying on the trend of modem decisions, held
not only that the use of the word "bequest" did not have any tendency to
overcome the presumption of consideration-which all negotiable paper has
expressly by statute in Iowa-but also that the fact that the payee of the
note was the church of which the maker was a member caused a wholly
distinct and additional presumption of consideration to arise. It is well
settled that where such notes are given as subscriptions, and the payee takes
some action relying on them, action is sufficient consideration f9r the note.
Beatty's Estate v. Western College, 177 Ill. 28o, 52 N. E. 432; Irwin v. Lombard University, 56 Ohio St. 9, 46 N. E. 63. The same is true where the
note is used to induce others to subscribe. Trustees v. Nayes, 165 Iowa 161,
146 N. W. 848; Brokaw v. M cElroy, 162 Iowa 288, 143 N. W. 1o87; though
the earlier decisions held such to be mere naked promises and refused to
enforce them. Albert Lea College v. Brown, 88 Minn. 524. 93 N. W. 670;
In re Helfenstein's Estate, 77 Pa. St. 328; and it has been held that a note,
payable after the death of the maker, given by her "desiring to advance the
cause of missions and to induce others to contribute to that purpose" was
supported by a sufficient consideration in the great interest the maker had
in the accomplishment of the object in aid of which it was given. Garrigus
v. Society, 3 Ind. App. 91, 28 N. E. 1009. See also Hegeman v. Moon, 131
N. Y. 462, 30 N. E. 487.
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BILLS AND Non:s-UNCERTAINTY OF TIME OF PAYMENT.-A promissory
note was made payable 90 days. after date, with the proviso that "this note
shall become due and payable on demand at the option of the holder, when
it deems itself insecure." Held, the time of payment was uncertain and the
note non-negotiable. State Bank v. Paving Co. (Wash. I9I7), I62 Pac. 870.
The majority of cases bold that the negotiability of a note is not destroyed
.by a provision giving the maker an option to pay it before maturity. School
District v. Hall, u3 U. S. I35, 28 L. Ed. 954; Lowell Trust Co. v. Pratt,
I83 Mass. 379, 67 N. E. 363; Bank v. Kenney, g8 Tex. 293, 83 S. W. 368. And
this is the rule adopted as to notes providing for payment on or before a
certain date. Dorse31 v. Wolff, I84 Ill. IS8, 56 N. E. 297; Mattison v. Marks,
3I Mich. 42I, I8 Am. Rep. 197; Smith v. Ellis, 29 :Me. 422; N£GOT. INSTR.
LAW, §6. Contra, Way v. Smith, III Mass. 523; Stutts v. Silva, II9 Mass. 137;
Chanteau v. Allen, 70 Mo. 335. Though the time must be fixed or determinable (see NEGOT. INSTR. LAW, §3) this requirement is satisfied if the note
is made payable on or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified
event, which is certain to happen, though the time of happening is uncertain.
Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn. 9; Shaw v. Camp, I6o Ill. 425, 43 N. E. 6o8;
Hegeman v. Moon, 6o Hun. 412, 30 N. E. 487; NEGOT. INSTR. LAW, §6. Also
a provision that the note is to become due at once, upon failure to pay any
installment of either principal or interest, does not render the instrument nonnegotiable. Carlson v. Kenealy, I2 Mees. & W. I39, I3 L. J. Exch. N. S. 64;
Markey v. Corey, Io8 Mich. 184, 66 N~ W. 493; Equipment Co. v. National
Bank, I36 U. S. 268; Hunter v. Clarke, 184 Ill. 158, 56 N. E. 297. But see,
Kimball'Co. v. Mellon, 8o 'Wis. 133, 48 N. W. uoo; Bank v. Carter, 144 Iowa
715, 123 N. W. 237. And it has been held that notes were negotiable where
the provision was that the holder might declare them due at once on failure
of the ~er to perform certain conditions in an accompanying mortgage.
Thorpe v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, IOI N. W. 417; Hunter v. Clarke, supra;
Consterdine v. Moore, 65 Neb. 291, g6 N. W. 1021. Contra, Wistrand v.
Parker, 7 Kan. App. 562, 52 Pac. 59. It will be noticed that in all the above
cases the provision for the acceleration of the time of payment was either
within the control of the maker or else without the control of either the
maker or holder. In no case was the contingency wholly within the control
of the .holder. Provisions giving the bolder the option of declaring the
note payable before the date of maturity have generally been held to render
the note non-negotiable. Richards v. Barlow, 140 Mass. 218, 6 N. E. 68;
Bank v. Russell, 124 Tenn. 618, I39 S. W. 734; Yearly Meeting v. Babler,
us Wis. 289, 9I N. W. 678. In the instant case the court considers the contentioi;i th;it the provision that the bolder may declare the note due when be
deems himself insecure may well be construed to transform the note into
qJte payable on demand. It points out that th~ exercise of the power to
declare the note due does not grow out of anY act or promise of the maker,
but is wholly a contingency over which the maker has no control, a situation
dealt with in §6 of the Statute which expressly provides that an instrument
payable upon a contingency is not negotiable. This view is supported by the
weight of authority. Bank v. Carter, 144 Iowa 7I5, I23 N. W. 237; Bank v.
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Bynum,~ N. C. 24; Bank v. Strother, 28 S. C. 504. 6 S. E. 313; Bank v•.
Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, II6 Pac. 239. Contra, Heard v. Dflbu.que Co. Bank,
8 Neb. Io, 30 Am. Rep. Sn.
CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAw-D~ PRoctss oF LAw.-The WorkJ,llen's Compensation Law of New York (Chapter 816, Laws 1913, as reenacted and amended
by Chapter 41, Laws of 1914 and amended by Chapter 316, Laws 1914) does
not violate the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. New
Ycrk Central Railroad Company v. Sarah White, 37 Sup. Ct. 247.
It will be recalled that in the case of Ives v. SoutJ: Buffalo Ry. Co., 201
N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, 34 L. R. A. N. S. 162, Ann. Cas. l912B 156, the
New York court had declared Article I4a (Chapter 674 of the laws of 1910),
which was an insertion to the general labor law and dealt particularly ~ith
employer's liability, to be violative of the provisions in the State constitution
as to due process. The court admitted that the Legislature might abolish .
the rule of fellow servant, assumption of risk and contributory negligence
as defenses in an action for damages sustained by a workman, hut denied
that "a person employed in a lawful vocation, the effects of which are confined to his own premises, can he made to indemnify another for injury
received in the work unless he has been in some respect at fault." For a
criticism of this case, see 9 MICH. L. RJ>v. 704 To obviate this difficulty,
the State constitution was changed by the insertion of section 19 to article
l, the amendment becoming effective Jan. 1st, 1914 This section provides,
inter alia, that nothing in the constitution should be construed to prohibit
the payment of compensation for injuries or death to employees regardless
of fault in the employer. The statute in question was passed after the
adoption of the constitutional amendment and has been held by the New
York Court of Appeals to be consistent with both the State and Federal
constitutions. Matter of Jensen v. Southern Pacific Co., 215 N. Y. 514
The new statute contains much the same provisions as were found in article ,
I~ of the previous statute, which the .court had found to be a deprivation
of due process" under the provisions of the State constitution as it read
previous to the amendment referred to above. The new statute extends the
scope of the act, making it applicable to 42 groups of hazardous occupations
and ''by sec. so ~ch employer is required to secure compensation ta his
employees in one of the following ways; (1) By insuring and keeping in-.
sured the payment of such compensation in the State fund; or (2) through.
any stock corporation or mutual association authonzed to transact the business of workmen's compensation insurance in the State; or (3) by furnish-.
ing satisfactory proof to the Commission of his financial ability to pay
such compensation for himself." In answer to the argument that the Act
is unconstitutional in that it creates l~hility without fault-the employer
being liable according to a fixed scale !or any injury resulting in the course
of employment to employee which is not the result of the latter's willful
negligence or drunkenness-the court refers to certain common law instances
where one may he held liable without fault, e. g.. common carrier, innkeeper7
one who maintains a. dangerous agency on his premises is liable fur damages
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incurred through its escape. It is true that this regulation does materially
limit the contractual liberty of both the employer and employee, but the
law being desirable from an economic and sociological viewpoint, it may be
said to have a close relation to the welfare of the public and there.fore be
a justifiable e."ercise of the police power. The Federal Supreme Court
had previously upheld the constitutionality of a similar employer's liability
law passed by Congress with reference to interstate commerce, Mondou v.
N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry. Co., 223 U. S. l, 32 Sup. Ct. l6g, 56 L. Ed. 327, 38
L. R. A. N. S. 44; and many State courts have upheld the validity of such
legislation. Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 6o7, 6g N. E. 3o8; Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N. W. 209, 37
L. R. A. N. S. 489; State ex rel. Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349;-Sexton
Newark I;Jist. Tel. Co., &i N. J. L. 85, 86 N. J. L. 701; Deibekis v. LinkBell Co., 261 Ill. 454; Crooks v. Ta~ell Coal Co., 263 Ill. 343; Victor
Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, 274 Ill. II; Mathison v. Minn. St. Ry.
Co., 126 Minn. 286; Shade v. Cement Co., 92 Kans. 146, 93 Kans. 257; Sayles
v. Foley (R. I. 1916), g6 Atl. 340; Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571; Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co. (Texas 1916),_ 185 S. W. 556. And in
the case of Hauikins v. Bleakly, Auditor of State, 37 Sup. Ct. 255, decided
by the Federal Supreme Court on the same day as the instant case, .the
Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act was held to be consistent with the
14th Amendment, the Iowa court having previously held in another case
that the act was not contrary to any of the provisions of the· State constitution. Hunter v. Colfax Consolidated Coal Co. (Iowa. 1915)~ 154 N. W.
1037, 157 N. ·w. 145· .

v.

CoNSTITU'l'IoNAL LAw-D~ PRoctSs m WORKusN's CoMPSNSATION Ac:r.
-The State of Washington passed a Workmen's Compensation Act (Chapter
74 of Laws of 19II) which classified the various employments according to
the probability of injury to employees, and provided that the employers in
each group should pay.into the State treasury a certain ai'.nount·towards an
insurance fund, the amount to be a certain percentage of their pay roll,
which percentage was based on the group in which the particular industry
had been classified, the lowest being 1~% in case of textile industries and
the highest being lo% in the case of powder works. "For the purpose of
such ·payments accounts shall be kept with each industry in ac~ordance with
the classification herein provided and no class shall be liable for the depletion of the accident fund from accidents happening in any other class. Each
class shall meet and be liable for the accidents occurring in such class."
The contributions thus exacted are the sole source of compensation for
injured employees and for the dependent families of those employees who
· are ·killed in the course of their employment. Held, such a statute is a
valid exercise of the police power and does not take property without due
process of law. Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington, 37 Sup. Ct. 26o.
All the atguments against the constitution.ality of the New York Workmen's Compensation Act were also urged her~ As to these, ·the court
summarily disposed of them by a reference to its opinion that day rendered
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in the case of New York Central Railroad Company v. White, supra, upholding the New York statute. But an additional factor in this case was
the enforced contribution to the insurance fund-such a proceeding being
optional with the employer under the New York statute. The act is also ·
different from the Ohio statute upheld in State v. Creamer, Bs Ohio St. 349,
97 N. E. 6o2, 39 L. R. A. N. S. 694. as that statute, though providing that
those who accepted the act should pay a certain percentqge into a State insurance fund, did not make its acceptance compulsory, although those employers who did not accept were deprived of certain common law defenses.
The statute in that State has since been changed so as to require all employers to accept the act and pay a certain percentage into the State insurance
fund. Under the plan in effect in Washington, despite the fact that the
employer is careful and his employees are free from accidents, yet he must
pay a prescribed amount into the treasury, a part of which may be used in
paying for injuries susbined by the employes of his perhaps negligent competitors. The facts of the case are similar to those involved in Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104. 31 Sup. Ct. 186, SS L. Ed. n2, 32 L. R A.
N. S. lo62, Ann Cas. 1912A 487, in which the Federal Supreme Court "sustained an Oklahoma statute whii:h levied upon every bank existing under
the laws of the State an assessment of a percentage of the bank's average
deposits, for the purpose of creating a guaranty fund to make good the losses
of depositors in insolvent banks." And it would seem that the decision in
the instant case goes even further than the decision in the quoted case,
which to many seemed a radical opinion. For in the bank case it is possible
to discover much more reason for· requiring a State insurance fund than
in the case of employers, there is more of a solidarity of interest among
bankers than among employers, whose only community of interest is the
:fact that their trades are considered equally hazardous. In Bank v.
Haskell the court asks itself where it will draw the line in reqµiring ·corporations to guarantee each other's solvency, but dismisses the query with
the remark that these cases will be determined by the gradual approach
and contact of decisions on the opposing sides. The Chief Justice, and
Justices McKr:NNA, v. . N DSVANTtR and McRsYNOLDS dissented .from the
opinion delivered by the majority, evidently feeling that the facts here were
different from those involved in Bank v. Haskell, and that the balance of
justice lay in favbr of the "due process" clause· as opposed to the police
power. However, the majority, speaking through Mr. Justice· PrrNtY, was
of the opinion that the general welfare of the public was so closely related
to the passage of such a law as to justify such interference with private
liberty or right of acquiring property as might result from the carrying into
effect of such a law. It being to- the interest of the State to provide some
sort of industrial pension for the "soldier of organized industry" beco~g
unfit while in the discharge ·of hi~ duty for further service, ii: lay within
the discretion of the State to exercise its police power by laying a tax upon
the industries which gave rise to these accidents and to apportion the burden
<>f sustaining these injured workmen upon the various industries in the
proportion in which they ordinarily cause injuries. "It cannot be deemed
0
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arbitrary or unreasonable for th~ State, ipstead of imposing upon the particular employer entire responsibility for losses occurring in his own plant
or work, to impose the burden upon the industry through a system of occupation taxes limited to the actual losses occurring in the respective classe.<;
of occupation."
CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAW-EQUAi. PROTSCTION OF THS LAw.-A California
statute prov.iding that persons may not practice drugless healing unless holding a "drugless practioner certificate" obtainable only upon completion of a
prescribed course of study and after an examination contained an exemption
in favor of persons treating the sick by prayet. Held, that the exemption
does not render the statute invalid as denying the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed· by the Fourteenth Amendment, to one who does not employ prayer in his treatment of disease, but does use faith, hope, the process
of mental suggestion and mental adaptation, a form of treatment in which
skill enhanced by practice is to be exercised. Crane v. Johnson, 37 Sup. Ct.
176; McNaughton .v. Johnson, 37 Sup. Ct. 178.
lt is fundamental that the police power of the state particularly extends
to regulating trades and callings concerning public health, and practitioners
of medicine are properly subject to police regulation, the details of which
are primarily with the legislature, and are not to be interferred with by the
Federal courts so long as constitutional rights are not violated. Dent v.
West Virginia, 128 U.S. 114 9 Sup. Ci 231, 32 L. Ed. 623. Ex parte Ira W.
<;oll~, 57 Tex. Cr. 'R 2, 121 S. W. 501, upholds a statute which requires
all who practice medicine to be licensed, and defines medicine as meaning
"the art of healing by whatever scientific or supposedly scientific method may
be used." Under this Classification, osteopaths were required to be licensed.
In affirming the case the Federal Supreme Court stated, "We are not called
upon to speculate upon other cases, or to decide whether the followers of
Christian Science or other people might in some event have cause to complain." Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 32 Sup. Ct. 286, 56 L. Ed. 439.
It has also been held that a classification based upon whether or not the
medic;J1 practitioner receives. compensation is a valid method of determining
who sho~ld be required to be licensed. Watson v. Maryland, 218 tt. S. i73,
39 Sup. Ct. 6# 54 L. Ed. g87; Arnold v. Schmidt, 155 Wis. 55, 143 N. W.
1055. In Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 221 Mass. 184, lo8 N. E. 8g3, "it
was held that a. chiropractor was a practitioner ·of medicine within the statute
requiring practitioners of medicine to be licensed; and that the statute did
11,0t deprive him of the equal protection of the laws because those practicing
Christian Science and mind cures were exempted. It will be observed that
in the last quoted case the practitioners of Christian Science and also those
w~o, t~h i'.\l?t C,h~stian ·"$cienc_e practitioners, ,effected their cures through
mental suggestion, were exempted from the. operation of the statute. In
~ instant case, a classification which differentiated between the two was
upheld, those who practiced drugless healing without prayer were required
to complete a ~escribed; course of study before being allowed to practke
'l'll;i.ile no such requirement was made as to those who p:racticed through the
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use of prayer. The court was of the opinion that the petitioner himself
admitted that his science was one in which skill is to be exercised, and the
skill with which he might pursue his calling would be enhanced by practice,
therefore it was reasonable that he be required to complete a professional
course before being allowed to practice, while, the cure of disease by prayer
being entirely a religious practice, it is not to be presumed that the efficac,
of the practitioner's methods are benefited by any preparatory course. It
,must also be consi9ered that one who assails a classification as a violation
of the equal-protection clause of the constitution must carry the burden
of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially
arbitrary. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 31 Sup. CL
337, 55 L. Ed. 36g. See also comment on Fealey v. Birmingham (Ala. 1916),
73 So. 296, in IS MICH. L. Rsv. 440.
CoRl'ORATIONS-LIAllILITY FOR AssAur.T BY S£R.VANT.-Defendant's agent,
who was what is known as "cut-off man," had been expressly instructed
not to enter a house in case entry was objected to; he forced an entry into
plaintiff's apartment, on failure of plaintiff to pay arrears for lighting service,
and personally assaulted the plaintiff. Below, the defendant's demurrer was
sustained, apparently on the ground that since the acts complained of were
contrary to express instntctions, the assault, if any, was committed while
the agent was acting ·beyond the scope of his employment. Held, such instructions would not necessarily relieve the defendant of liability for the
assault, if in fact the agent committed the assault in the course of the prosecution of the business intrusted to him by the defendant. Herrman v. New
York Edison Co., 162 ~. Y. Supp. 145.
It was maintained in a few early cases that since a cotporation can do
only the lawful things contemplated by the state in the bestowal of its '
charter, any wrongful act of an officer or agent is necessarily outside the
field of its legal power. Ill. Cent. R. Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 484, 87 Am. Dec.
200. It is well settled now, however, that a corporation is liable for the
wrongful acts or omissions of its officers or agents acting within the scope
of their authority, although in doing the act, the agent may have disobeyed
instructions. Pittsburgh & R. Co. v. Sullivan, l4I Ind. 83, 40 N. E. 138.
And this, even though the act be done wantonly and recklessly. Moore v. Ry.,
26 Okl. 682, no Pac. 1059· It is interesting to note that several states refuse
to accept this principle as applied to the agent's false or slanderous statements, holding that even where the words are spoken in the course of the
employment, and for the benefit of the corporation, the latter is not liable
unless it had expressly authorized the agent to speak the words in question,
or had subsequently ratified them. Behre v. National Cash Register Co.,
loo Ga. 213, 27 S. E. !)86. In Lindsey v. St. Louis etc. R. Co., 95 Ark. 534.
129 S. W. 8o7, the court offers a reason for this distinction, saying that
slander is the individual act of him who utters it, and the utterance of a:
slander by an agent of a corporation must be ascribed to the personal malice
of the agent. But why this distinction between a slander and an assault
made contrary to express instructions? It would seem that the better view
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is that of Rivers v. Yazoo etc R. Co., 90 Miss. lg6, 43 So. 471, that the corporation is liable for the agent's. slander spoken while acting within the
scope of his empioyment, and in the actual performance of the duties of the
corporation touching the matter in question. Or as the Montana court holds,
in Grorfld v. Lossl, 48 Mont. 274. 136 Pac. lOOg, in speaking of an act by
the agent within the apparent scope of his authority: "and if the act is
prompted by fraudulent or malicious motives, the agent's fraud or malice
is imputable to the corporation."
. CRIMINAI, LAW-lNl10RMA'tlON CHARGING S'l.'A'J.'U'tORY O!!Fr:NS~ IN TER.YS
S'l.'A'J.'U'l.'S.-An information charged the accused with committing "the
acts techni~ally known as fellatio" made a felony by the California Penal
Code of 1915. The defendant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.·
Held, that the judgment should be reversed on the ground that '"the acts
constituting the offense' were not charged m such a manner as to enable
'a person of common understanding to know what is intended.'" People v•.
Garrell (Cat 1917), 161 Pac. 99S.
As a general ·rule, offenses proscnoed and defined by a statute must be
charged in the language of the statute, or in language equivalent thereto.
Jackson
State, :z6 Fla. 510, 7 So. 862; State v. Stubbs, lo8 N. C. 774. 13
S. E. go; Franklin v. State, 1o8 Ind. 47; 22 CYc. 336; II L. ·R. A. 530 note.
If the statute itself enumerates every· ipgredient of the offense, then an indictment describing a statutbry offense in the very words of the statute is
ordinarily suffi,cient. B~, CRIYINAI. Pr.!:AD1NG AND PRAC'J.'1~, §197; Pounds
v. United States, 171 U. S. 35; People v. Paquin, 74 Mich. 34. 41 N. W. 852;
State v. Whalen, g8 Iowa 662, 68 N. W. 554; State v, Bier'ce, 27 Conn. 318.
In State v. Whalen, supra, the court sustained a conviction under an indictment, which, following the wording of the statute, charged the accused
with "seducing" a certain female. Neither the statute nor the information
defined the word "seduce." The conclusion was put upon the ground. that
"seducing" included all the elements of the offense nieant to be charged, and
sufficiently fuformed the accused of the crime a11eged. The decision in State
v. Bierce announced the same rule for a similar state of facts. The exceptions to the rule as set forth above are, for the most part, cases in which
the words of the statute have a technical legal meaning different from their
common meaning. • The oddity of the principal case lies ·in the fact that the
Victorian modesty of the legislature has led them to define the crime by a
term which has no common meaning, which is not found in any English
dictionary, law or lay, and which remains somewhat ambiguous even after
reference to the Latin authorities.
o"l!

v.

·EQUl'J.'Y-CaAN liANDS.-In order to defeat a judgment in an anticipated
suit for divorce and alimony, plaintiff, without considerabon, deeded a parcel
of land to his mother. He thereafter regained possession of the land and
sued her to quiet title. Held, plaintiff did not come into court with clean
hands, and relief should be denied. Palmer v. Palmer (Neb. 1917), 161 .N.
277.

w.
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Relief is invariably denied where the party defendant has not participated
in the unconscionable conduct, and the instant decision expresses the prevailing view even though defendant is shown to be likewise a wrongdoer.
Boggs v. Bright, 222 Fed. 714; Comellier v. Haverhill Shoe Assoc., 221 Mass.
554' 109 N. E. 643. Assistance has been given in sporadic cas.es where complainant has seemed the less guilty, and where it would be inequitable, in
spite of his wrong, to refuse his prayer. The courts are quick to find, in
these instances, that the complainant's wrong does not directly touch the
matter in litigation. Warfield v. Adams, 215 Mass. 5o6; Pitzele v. Cohn,
217 Ill. 30, 75 N. E. 392; Gargano v. Pope, 184 Mass. 571, 6g N. E. 343.
Relief has been given in one class of cases which should, on principle, include the one above. Those decisions indicate that where the suit is in
its nature defensive, the maxim of "clean hands" is not applicable.
Lord Porlarlington v. Soulby, 3 Mylne & Keen 104; Newman v. Franco,
2 Anstruther 519. A suit to quiet title is substantially of that sort. The
marketability of the property is impaired, and ~onsequently its present value
is diminished by the possibility that the claim· constituting the cloud may
some time be asserted in court. It is the gist of complainant's prayer that
he be permitted to anticipate this assertion, and to offer his defense at once.
Evmr:NCE-RtAl>ING Mr:i>1CAL Booxs TO JURY ON CRoss-ExAMlNATlON' oit
ExnRTs.-A passenger sued for personal injuries received through the
negligent management of defendants' train; defendants introduced medical
experts who testified that the plaintiff's injuries were simulated. In the
cross-examination of these medical experts, the court permitted plaintiff's
counsel to read to the jury excerpts from acknowledged standard medical
authorities, to which the witnesses had not made reference in their direct
examination. Held, that the excerpts were properly read; this being an exception to the general rule which forbids the reading of books of inductive
science as affirmative evidence of the facts treated of. Scullin et al. v. Vining
(Ark. 1917), 191 S. W. 924The instant case stands practically without support on the proposition
that excerpts from standard medical authorities, on which the witness has
not based his opinion, may be read to the jury as evidence. There is a
marked difference. between reading what is in a hook as evidence to a jury,
and reading exceri>ts from books to the witness for the purpose of testing
his knowledge on the subject treated. In one case the mere opinion of a
scholar is offered as evidence without opportunity to cross-examine him.
In the other the opinion of the expert is tested by the opinions of other experts. Apparently the court was confused. It decided that excerpts might be
read to the jury as evidence, when it apparently intended to decide only that
e..xcerpts from authorities on which the witness had not based his opinion
might be read to the witness, for the purpose of testing his knowledge. The
cases agree that when an expert has based his opinion on a particular authority, the counsel on cross-examination may read an excerpt from that authority, anq ask for his views upon it. See Bloomington v. Schrock, IIO Ill.
219, 51 Am. Rep. 678; Clark v. Commonwealth, III Ky. 443, 63 S. W. 74().

520

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

Or the authority may be introduced in evidence, and such extracts as contradict the expert may be read to the jury, purely for the purpose of discrediting the witness. Unioii Pacific Ry. Co. v. Yates, 79 Fed. 584, 49 U. S.
App. 241; Eggart v. State, 40 Fla. 527, 25 So. 144; Pinney v. Cahill, 48 Mich.
584, 12 N. W. 862; People v. Wheeler, 6o Cal. 581, 44 Am. Rep. 70. On
the question whether counsel may cross-examine an expert on authorities
on which the witness has not based his opinion, or only on such as he has
based his opinion, there is a decided conflict of authorities. The following
cases, with the instant case, allow examination on aclmowledged standard
authorities whether witness has based his opinion on them or not; on the
theory, that expert witnesses are dangerous and every legitimate means
should be used to test the soundness of their theories and show their want
of lmowledge. Davis v. United States, 165 U. S. 373, 17 Sup. Ct 36o, 410
L. Ed. 750; Fisher v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 8g Cal. 399, 26 Pac. 894; Hess
v. Lowery, 122 Ind. 225, 23 N. E. 156, 7 L. R A. 90, 17 Am. St. Rep. 355;
Egan v. Dry Dock & R. Co., 12 App. Div. i;56, 42 N. Y. Supp. 188; Byers
v. Nashville & R. Co., 94 Tenn. 345, 29 S. W. 128; Clukey v. Seattle Electric
'Co., 27 Wash. 70, 67 Pac. 379. The following cases hold admissible excerpts
only from authors upon whom the witness has based his opinion, and these
may be read to the jury for the purpose of directly contradicting him.
Foley v. Grand Rapids & R. Co., 157 Mich. 67, 121 N. W. 257; Marshall v.
Brown, 50 Mich. 148, 15 N. W. 55; Butler v. South Carolina & R. Extension
Co., 130 N. €. 15, 40 S. E. 770; Mitchell v. Leech (S. C.), 48 S. E. 290,.66
L. R A. 723, 104 Am. St Rep. 8n.
GABNISH111r::n·-PRocnnmcs AGAI?!'S't CouN'.rY.-The plaintiffs had furnished materials to the defendant contractors who were working for the
county. Judgments against the contractor who. later became insolvent were
unsatisfied and the plaintiffs sought a decree of equitable garnishment against
the county. Judgment was rendered by the lower court in favor of the defendants, on the ground that in the absence of a statute specially conferring
the right, garnishment did not run against the county, either at law or in
equity. Held, that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Clork et al. v. Board of Com'rs of Osage County (Okla. 1916), 161 Pac. 791.
The authorities are divided on the question of garnishment againSt a
<;ounty, but the great weight of authority plainly supports the view that
garnishment will not lie against a county unless there is a statute specially
conferring that right For a full citation of authorities supporting both
views, see Roon, GARNISHMSN't, §18; 57 L. R A. 207 note; L. R A. 1916E
n63 note. It' should be noted that the problem concerns only the construction of general garnishment statutes and that both opposing views are based
on the same broad ground-public policy. After discussing the conflict of
decisions and the basic question of public policy, the cotirt in the principal
case decided in accordance with the majority rule and denied the right
of garnishment Despite the tendency of the great majority of courts, it
seems that public policy should favor garnishment of counties. While it
i~ admitted by the minority view, that, to some extent, the public Uiterest
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might be interfered with by the necessity of public officers defending litigation against ·creditors of the county, or by the sequestration of wages of
county employees, in thus promoting private interest or convenience, it is
evident that such allegations are sufficiently answered by stating that the
defense to such litigation involves very little trouble for the county, and
further, that, since men who pay their debts will work as faithfully for the
county as those who are dishonest, it is rather poor policy to induce disJlonest persons to seek public employment by protecting them in such avoid•
ance of their just debts. ROOD, GARNISH:MtNT, §22; Waterbury v. Board of
Com'rs of Deer Lodge Co., IO Mont. 515, 26 Pac. 1002. There are some decisions which by a bill in equity allow what may be termed "equitable garnishment" where counties are held to be exempt from the statutory garnishment
at law. Pendleton v. Perkins, 49 Mo. 565; Riggin v. Hilliard, 56 Ark. 476,
20 S. W. 402, 35 Am. St. Rep. u3. However, there should be no distinction
between law and equity in this regard. Statutes expressly authorizing garnishment to run against the county furnish strong evidence of the rule really
demanded by the better public policy. · See 4 MlcH. L. Rtv. 53HUSBAND AND WIFt-ActNCY OF WIJ.'t.-Defendant's wife bought hats
and gowns of plaintiffs, who were dressmakers, for the 18-year-old daughter
of the defendant, the wife telling plaintiffs that her husband would pay
the bills. She had no express authority, and the goods were found not to
be necessaries. Plaintiffs sent defendant bills for the purchases three months
in succession, and the wife continued to trade with plaintiffs. Defendant
did not answer the bills, believing that his daughter's mmority, and his
liability had ceased on her eighteenth birthday. Held, that the defendant's
failure to disaffirm those sales amounted to a ratification. Auringer v. Cochrane, (Mass. 1916) II4 N. E. 355.
·The question as to ratification by the husband comes up when the. wife
acts without the husband's express or implied authority. To charge the
husband under such circumstances, it is usually held that the credit must
ha;c been given to the liusband, not to the wife. Mackinley v. M'Gregor,
3 Wharton (Pa.) 369. If the husband receives the benefit of the transaction,
he will be held to have ratified it. Hill v. Sewald, 53 Pa. St. 2i'I; Gates v.
Brower, 9 N. Y. i!05; Althof v. Conheim, 38 Cal. 230. However if the husband has expressly forbidden the goods to be bought, and so informs the
vendor, he will not be liable for them, even if he afterwards uses them.
Segelbaum v. Ensminger, u7 Pa. 248. If the husband afterward expressly
promises to pay for goods furnished the wife, on his credit but without his
authority, it is a ratification. Conrad v. Abbott, 132 Mass. 330; Shaw v.
Emery, 38 Me. 484 It was held in Shuman v. Steinel, 129 Wis. 422, where
the wife bought a set of books, not assuming to act as the husband's agent,
and credit not being given to him, it would be a contract which could not
be ratified by his express promise to pay. Where the husband fails t.o disaflirm his wife's unauthorized action within a reasonable time, it is held to
be a ratification. If she wears jewelry in his presence suitable to his station
in life (Cooper v. Haseltine, 50 Ind. App. 4oo), or a hat (Ogden v. Prentice-,
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33 Barb. (N.Y.) I6g), or a silk dress (Graham v. Schleimer, 59 N. Y. Supp
68g), or false teeth (Gilman v. Andrus, 28 Vt. 24I), and he does not take
steps to show his dissent, he will be held to have ratified the purchase.
However, the case of Evans v. Insurance Co., 130 Wis. I8g, holds that where
the wife executed a conveii,nce in the husband's absence and he received
none of the benefits, his failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time did not
amount to a ratification. The principal case rests on the husband's failure
to disaffirm his wife's purchases within a reasonable time. If the daughter
· had not been a minor living at home, the defendant probably would not have
been held liable. Gaflield v. Scott, 40 IIL App. 38o, presents such a situation,
except that credit was giyen to the wife, riot to the husband. In the very
recent case of Altman v. Rosenfield, 162 N. Y. Supp. 678, the husband had
given the wife authority to buy a "nice coat" for the grown-up daughter,
"something costing :ibout $I5 to $25." The wife bought a coat costing $I35.
The husband was held liable, the court saying that the husband had given
express autho~ty to buy a coat, and his expression as to the price was a
mere opinion.
INJUNC'tioN-RIGHT 011 A TutsPASSING Ptrar.1c Sttvrcr: COMPANY To INJUNC'tION FOR PROn:CTioN 011 !Ts Lnra....,-The plaintiff company erected a
telegraph line over defendant's land without permission; the line being completed and in operation before defendant knew of its location. Defendant
removed the line from his land, and· plaintiff company, having instituted a
proceeding to. take the property under eminent domain, prays an injunction
pendente lite to enjoin interference with its line by the defendant. Held,
the injunction was properly refused. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. of Montana v. Nolan (Mont 19I6), 162 Pac. I68.
The function of a temporary injunction is preserve the status quo. In
this case, a temporary injunction would be quite effective. The comparative
injucy to the plaintiff in case the relief is not granted and to the defendant
in case the relief is granted is often considered in the granting or denying
of temporary injunctions. 5 Po:Mr:RoY, EQ. ]UR., §so2; Mabel Mining Co. v.
Pearson Co., I2I Ala. 567, 25 So. 754; Sellers v. Parvis & Williams Co., 30
Fed. 164 But this doctrine has no application where the act of one party
is admittedly wrongful. Bristol v. Palmer, 83 Vt. 54. 74 AtL 332, 3I L. R. A.
N. S. 88I. Cases in which a trespasser asks the aid of the court to protect
the erections which he has wilfully and wrongfully made on another's
land are very rare. The Washington court ix{ Everett Water Co. v. Powers,
37 Wash. I43, 79 Pac. 617, granted a temporary injunction in favor of the
plaintiff water company, which was wrongfully diverting the water to the
injury of the defendant. The court in the latter case was no doubt influenced
by the fact that the plaintiff was a publi~ service company, and had the right
of eminent domain. The great wclght of authority is that a court of equitY
will enjoin the taking of private property until the right to make an entry
is obtained in accordance with condemnation statutes. See IS MICH. L. Rn.
272. If the action of the public service company could be enjoined before
it extended its lines over one's- land, it is difficult to see how its wrongful
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erections can be consistently protected. Although the result may appear
to be very hard upon the plaintiff, the decision in the principal ease is no
doubt in accord with correct theory, and at its worst shows that a hard case
does not justify a deviation from settled principles.
lNJUNCTloN-Sr.AND:st oF TITL:i.:.-The life tenant of a parcel of land repeatedly declared that the fee simple thereto was in him and another, and
that he intended to sell same, thereby repudiating the title of the remaindermen. Held, such declarations constitute slander of title and cast a cfoud
thereon, and justify such relief as would fix the rights and protect the interests of the true owners. Elam v. Alexander (Ky. 1917), 191 S. W. 666.
Mere verbal claims cannot cast a cloud on title. Sulphur Mines Co. v.
'Boswell, 94 Va. 48<>, 27 ·S. E. 24; Devine v. City of Los Angeles, 202 U. S.
313. There are statutes which provide for the removal of a cloud on title
raised by mere assertion of claim, §soo ANN. Con:i,: oF Mxss. 18g2, but the
language used is not technical. As a matter of fact, oral claims may undoubtedly affect marketability, and so, in the ordinary s.ense, becloud title, but the
legal significance of the term is not So broad. It is used in the cases, not
to cover all instances where the value of title is diminished through an impairment of its marketability, but only in those cases where the means of
effecting that result is exerted in tangible form which a court of equity
may remove. Verbal claims may give rise to an action for damages, or
their 'repetition may be enjoined, but they constitute- no cloud on title, and
.the term is misused in the present case.
JUDGY1'!N't-M:stGER.-Plaintiff h:id a claim against one H. S.; in suing
upon this claim the writ was by misapprehension issued against a firm of
S. Bros., and servir.e made on one J. S. alleged to be a member of that firm,·
which in fact had no existence. No appearance was entered, and plaintiff
obtained a judgment by defa~lt against the supposed firm of S. Bros. This
unsatisfied judgment was never set aside. Subsequently plaintiff sued H. S.
and the latter pleaded the judgment against S. Bros. in bar. Held, the cause
of action against H. S. was not merged in a judgment against S. Bros.,
M. Isaacs & Sons v. Salbstein, 85 L. J. K. B. 1433.
The decision reached is undoubtedly an equitable one, and seems sound
in principle. ·The rule that a judgment against one of two joint debtors
is a bar to an acti'on against the other for the same debt does not cover this
case, for H. S. was not a joint debtor of any firm of S. Bros. King v. Hoare,
14 L. J. Ex. 29; Ward v. Johnson, 13 Mass. 148. The case is rather within
the rule of the Duchess of Kingston's Case (1776), 2 Smith's L. C. (12th
Ed.) 754- It was there held that a judgment may be relied on as an estoppel
only when it has resulted from a previous suit "between the same par.ties."
The principle in such cases is limited in its application to actions between
the same parties or any persons who were joint contractors with them in
the contract> which has been sued to judgment; or who were agents or principals of the party. A logical support for the instant decision is that the cause
of action against S. Bros. cannot be said to be the same cause of action which
plaintiff has against H. S.
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MARRIAG~ANNULM£NT :FOR FRAun.-The plaintiff, a man weakened by
age and by physical and mental disabilities, was induced to marry the defendant, who represented to him that she was a virtuous woman. In fact
her reputation for immorality was notorious. Plaintiff had a small amount
of property. Held, that the marriage should be annulled because of the
fraudulent representation. Entsminger v. Entsminger (Kans. 1916), 161
Pac. 00;.
The almost universal rule is that a marriage will not be annulled because
of ante-nuptial unchastity, either in case of mere concealment or in case of
positive misrepresentations· as to virtue. I'(arney v: Varney, 52 Wis. 120;
Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. lg6; Leavitt v. Letr.Jitt, 13 Mich. 452; Farr v. Farr,
2 MacArthur (D. C.) 35. In New York it is held, contrary to the general
rule, that a marriage will be annulled because of fraud when false representations have been made upon such a material matter that the marriage
would not have taken place l:iut for the misrepresentation. Di Lorenzo v. Di
Lorenzo, 174 N. Y. 467; Domschke v. Domschke, 122 N. Y. Supp.· 8g2. The
courts ·will atlllUl a marriage more readily when the defrauded party is very
young and inexperienced or is old and with impaired mental faculties. In
Lyndon v. Lyndon, 6g Ill 43; Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Vt. 95; and Robertson
v. Cole, 12 Tex. 356, marriages into which very young and inexperienced girls
were inveigled by misrepresentations were annulled, no consummation having
taken place. An exception to-the rUte that ante-nuptial unchastity is no
ground for divorce exists when the woman is pregnant by another man at
the time of marriage. Allen's Appeal, 99 Pa. St. lg6; Donovan v. Donovan,
91 Mass. (9 Allen) 140. But the .fact that a man before his marriage conceals or misrepresents the fact that another womaµ is pregnant from him
will not give his wife grounds to secure annulment. Hull v. Hull, 191 Ill
App. 307. The instant case goes· v~ far in allowing annulment. In Hides
v. Hides, 65 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 17, the plaintiff was old and infirm; defendant, a notoriously unchast.e woman, induced him to marry her by misrepresentations as to her virtue, and by statements that the spirits commanded· that they marry, she representing herself to be a medium and he
being a strong believer in spiritualism. The marriage was annulled. This
is a New York case where the rule as to annulment is very liberal. In
Browning ·v. Browning, 8g Kans. g8, a woman of thirty induced a boy of
nineteen to marry her, representing that she was virtqou~ and that she had
obtained a divorce froi;n her former husband, whereas she was a prostitute
and her former husband had divorced her for adultery: annulment was allowed at the suit of the boy. In Sylvester v. Sylvester, 180 Mich. 512, the
defendant wife had been unchaste before marriage; it was held that the marriage should not be annull~ on the ground that it did not clearly appeai;
that the plaiiitiff husbmd had not been intimate with her before marriage.
The court was evenly divided, four judges maintaining that there was not
sufficient evidence of his previous intimacy with her, and that annulment
should be granted'.
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MASTU AND S£R.VANT-ASSAULT BY ANOTHtR StRVANT NOT WITHIN FimEMPLOYtRS' LIABILITY ACT.-Plaintiff's husband, a section foreman, was
killed by a laborer in his section gang at a time when both were at work upon
defendant's road; the laborer was a dangerous and quarrelsome character, and
deceased had informed his superior officer of this fact. 'l,'he action was
brought under the FimtRAL EMPLOYtRS' LIABILITY ACT (U. S. Comp. St.
1913, §§8657-8665). The district court overruled a demurrer to plaintiff's
petition. Held, on appeal, that the order of the district court should be re.versed and the demurrer sustained on the ground that the assault was not
committed in the course or scope of the laborer's erµployment, nor in furtherance of defendant's business. Roebuck v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.
(Kan. 1917), 162 Pac. u53.
It is indubitably true that the test to be applied in cases of this character
is whether the act committed is within the "course" or "scope of' the servant's employment. If a servant step aside even momentarily to do some act
unconnected with his employment the relation of master and servant is for·
that time suspende~ Davis v. Houghtelin, 33 Neb. 582, 50 N. W. 765';
Marier v. St. Paul, etc. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 351. In tliis connection, also,
a distinction should be noted between "scope of employment" and "during
period of employment." Slater v. Advance Thresher Co., 97 Minn. 305, 107
N. W. 133; Riley v. Roach, 168 Mich. 294, 134 N. W. 14- On the above
points the principal case is undoubtedly correct. However, there still remains the question of defendant's negligence. Under the FEDtRAL EMPLOn&s'
LIABILITY ACT, supra, the common law rules in regard to negligence apply.
The master is liable only where the injury is attributable to ·his negligence.
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, .s8 L. Ed. lo62. In this
case the Supreme Court, speaking through PITNEY, J., after stating that the
employer is not a guarantor of the safety of the place of work, says· "the extent of its duty to its employees is to see that ordinary care and prudence
are exercised, to the end that the place in which the work is to be performed
* * * may be safe for the workmen." In the principal case the defendant
company had notice of the character of the defendant's assailant. In view of
this did defendant exercise ordinary care and prudence to make deceased's
place of employment safe? It is submitted that this should have been left
to the jury to de'cide. It is true that most of t}le cases on this topic are·
those in which the employee was a notorious drunkard or insane. Arlington
Hotel Co. v. Tanner (Ark. 1914), 164 S. W. 286; Mi$souri, K. & T. Ry. Co.
v. Day, 104 Tex. 237, 136 S. W. 435. However, there is no reason why the
principle should be limited to such cases. A dangerous and quarrelsome
character can render a place quite as unsafe as can a notorious drunkard or
insane person.
:£R,AL
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PARENT A-ND C:e:ILD-L!AlllLl'tY FOR >i'ORT OF Ca:w>.-Defendant -owned
automobile which he had purchased for the pleasure of himself and the
members of his family; his adult son, with his father's peFmission, was driv•
ing the automobile for his (the son's) accommodation, and negligently in-
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jured plain?ff. Held, defendant is not liable. Van Blaricom v. Dodgson
(N. Y. 1917), us N. E.
A similar view was taken by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the recent
case of Johnston v. Cornelius, 159 N. W. 318, in which the son was a minor,
17 years of age. There would seem to be little doubt as to this conclusion,
and yet the contrary result bas been reached by a number of courts. All
the courts admit that no liability arises merely from the relation of parent
and child. In Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. 10, L. R. A. 1916 F 216,
it was held that in keeping the car to be used for the comfort and pleasure
of her family, including her minor son, the defendant would be liable for her
son's negligence in driving it, on the ground that such use was her business
or affair, and that the son was her agent or servant. In other woras, the
son is placed in the same class with a hired chauffeur. This view may be
correct in such cases as Denison v. McNorton, 228 Fed. 401, where the son
was driving other members of the family at the time of the accident, for
their pleasure. But it is difficult to see bow the principle of respondeat superior should apply when the clilld is .SUi juri.r and is driving the.car solely.
for bis own pleasure. It would seem that the presumption of agency, on·
which these decisions are based, can be rebutted only by showing an express
refusal to allow the child to run the automobile. The reasoning of the New.
York court seems preferable. ''The question whether one person is the ·agent
of another in respect of some transaction is to be determined by the fact
~bat be represents and is acting for him, rather than by· the consideration
that it will be inconvenient or unjust if he is not held to be bis agent." The
question -raised in these cases bas previously been discussed in 7 MICH. L. IG:v.
18o, 526, and'12 M1c:a:: L. Riw. ISJ.
0

~s-FiFTY-YtAB OPTION AS A P~Y.-A fifty-year option
for a· tease, with the right in the meantime to enter and explore for minerals,
was alleged to be void because it suspended the power of alienation and
violated the rule against perpetuities. Held, that tlre option· was valid; the
court remarking that to hold it void would invalidate every option for the
purchase of land to be exercised within any period, no matter how short,
not measured by lives in being. Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co.
(Minn. 1916), 159 N. W. g66.
The court in the.in$tant case res~ its conclusion on the construction of
the statutory rule against perpetuities which prevails in Michigan and New
York, as well as Minnesota; that a perpetuity is created by the suspension
of the power of alienation for a period greater than the perpetuity period;
but when an absolute fee can be conveyed by persons in being, as by the
· defendant in the instant case executing a release at .the time the plaintiff
conveys -~~- !itle, there is no restraint on alienation, hence no perpetuity.
Avern v. LZ~d, L. -R. S Eq. 383, is followed to this extent, but see "In re
Hargreaves,
Ch. D. 401, also Winsor v. Mills, 157 Mass. 362, 32 N. E. 352.
The notion that su.ch options are void started in England in London &
W.
Ry. v~ Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 256, which held that an option which might be ex-ercised at a timi: more remote than the perpetUity-period was void. The
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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
authorities in this country are nearly evenly divided. The few cases in which
the point has been decided are reviewed in 14 MICH. LAW R.iw. 231 in a comment on Woodal v. Bruen (W. Va. 1915), 85 S. E. 170. To the cases there
cited should be added Buck v. Walker, II5 Minn. 239, 132 N. W. 205, Ann.
Cas. 1912D 882, which is cited and followed by the principal .case. See also
In re Garde Browne, [19n] I Ir. R. 205, where a covenant in a fee-farm grant
enabling the grantee to fine down the rent of £42 to a peppercorn, was held
pot to violate the rule against perpetuities. See 23 CASt AND Co:r.i:l!tNT 835,
for article by JOHN R. RooD, on OPTIONS AND THt Rux.t .AGAINST Pr:aPS'rUITitS.

ToRTS-LIABII.ITY OF LABOR UNION FOR S'tRIKt.-Complainant is a ship
<:ompany engaged as a common carrier, and as a carrier of United State5
mail; its employees struck, and defendants. composing the union of which
they were members, picketed the wharves of complainant and inti~idated
other laborers from accepting complainant's offers of employment. Rocks
were thrown on the wharves either by union members or by some persons
who mingled with the men on strike, and complainant's business and access
to its ships were in other ways interfered with by acts of violence. In a
suit brought against the union, a voluntary unincorporated society, to obtain
an injunction, Held, that the interference with complainant's transportation,
business by violence was unlawful, and that it should be enjoined. Alaska
S. S. Co. v. International Longshoreman's Association of Puget Sound et al.,
236 Fed. ¢4.
.
The right of workmen to strike, when free from contractual obligations,
is.undoubted.· Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753, n6 Am. St.
Rep. 272, 6 L. R. A. N. S. I667; Longshore Printing & Publishing Co. v.
Howell, 26 Ore. 527, 38 Pac. 547, 46 Am. St. Rep. 64o, 28 L. R. A. 464 But
the use of force, violence or intimidation to obtain the ends for which the
strike was called is illegal. Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union,
u8 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13, 14 Am. St. Rep. 421, 42 L. R. A. 407; Vegelahn
"V. Gunter, 157 Mass. 92, 44 ·N. E. 1077, 57 Am. St. Rep. 453, 55 L. R. A. 92: .
Goldfield Consolidated Mining Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union; 159 Fed. 500;
Quinn v. Leathem, [190I] A. C. 495, 85 L. T. 289. That the individuals •engaging in such iUegal acts would be subject' to a civil or criminal liability,
<>r bQth, is selfevident. But the principal case lays·down the rule that a labor
union, conducting a strike, is liable for the unlawful acts of members and
ethers associating themselves with the strikers, unless such acts be disavowed,
and, in the case of members, the offenders be disciplined or expelled. That
a union is liable for the acts of its pickets or members, notwithstanding the
·fact that it has instructed them not to use violence or intimidation or lawlessness of any kind, seems clear. Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed, 102.
This is on the theory that the union is liable, as having aided and abetted
such unlawful conduct. Jones v. Maher et al., n6 N. Y. Supp, 18o, 62 Misc.
388. The rule adopted in the principal case merely carries the same theory
-0ne step further and says that the union must be held liable for the unlawful
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acts of outsiders who may join the pickets and the men 011 strike. This
seems a sound view, for if thereafter the union continues its supervision of
the strike ,and accepts the benefits of such terrorism, it must be deemed a
party to the conspiracy. Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield
Miners' Union, 159 Fed. 500; Sailors' Union of the Pacific et al. v. Hammond
Lumber Co., 156 Fed. 450, 85 C. C. A. 16; Franklin Union No. 4 v. People,
121 Ill. App. 647.
WoRKM~N's

CoMP~NSATION-WHAT IS

HAZARDOUS EHPLOYM~NT?-De

ceased was a nightwatchman in defendant's bakery, and was killed by a fall
down a spiral stairway while on watchman duty while the plant was idle for
the nigh( The bakery business was enumerated by the New York Act as
a hazardous employment. Held, no recovery, as deceased was not within the
statute. Fogarty v. National Biscuit Co., (1916), 161 N. Y. Supp. 937.
The point involved is: Is the statute satisfied when the person injured
is simply in the employment of one epgaged in a business enumerated by th~
statute as "hazardoust or must he also have been engaged himself in a
hazardous ·occupation at the time of his injury? The New York statute
defines the term "employe" as one "* * * who is in the service of an employer whose principal business is that of carrying on * * * a hazardous
employment," etc. The situation in New York, apparently the only state in
which this particular question has arisen, is peculiar, inasmuch as the Court
of Appeals on May 12, 1916, in the case of In re Larson, 218 N. Y. 252, n2
N. E. 725, held that the immediate act in the performance of which plaintiff
was injured need not itself be hazardous, but that it is sufficient if such act
be fairly incidental to the prosecution of the business. In that case, deceased
was a general handy-man, but was killed while erecting a 'Shelf. Then six
months later the New York Supreme Court, in the principal case, without
re~erence to the Larson case, followed its previous. holdings in Matter of
Rheinwald, 168 App. Div. 425, 153 N. Y. Supp. 5981 and Lyon v. Windsor,
159 N. Y. Supp. 162, holding it essential that the decease~ have been himself
engaged in a hazardous occupation at the time of the injury. The theory of
the Court of Appeals seems to be that the compensation is provided for by
a system of insurance, in which the employer includes all of his employes,
whether engaged immediately iri hazardous occupations or not, and that the
letter· of the statute includes all employes. The theory of the inferior court
is that the intention of the legislature ·was that the risks incurred by those,
and only those, who do the manual. work of inherently dangerous employmen.ts, should be added to the cost of the product, and that the fact that the
employer insures himself against injury to all of his employes is an unsound
reason for including all within the statute, as such act by the employer {s
unnece!!sary and voluntary.

